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Abstract. We observe that the definitions of security in the computa-
tional complexity proof models of Bellare & Rogaway (1993) and Canetti
& Krawczyk (2001) require two partners in the presence of a malicious
adversary to accept the same session key, which we term a key shar-
ing requirement. We then revisit the Bellare–Rogaway three-party key
distribution (3PKD) protocol and the Jeong–Katz–Lee two-party au-
thenticated key exchange protocol T S2, which carry claimed proofs of
security in the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) model and the Bellare &
Rogaway (1993) model respectively. We reveal previously unpublished
flaws in these protocols where we demonstrate that both protocols fail
to satisfy the definition of security in the respective models. We present
a new 3PKD protocol as an improvement with a proof of security in the
Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) model and a simple fix to the specification
of protocol T S2. We also identify several variants of the key sharing
requirement and present a brief discussion.
1 Introduction
The treatment of computational complexity analysis for key establishment pro-
tocols was made popular by Bellare & Rogaway [5] in 1993, who provided the
first formal definition for a model of adversary capabilities with an associated
definition of security (which we refer to as the BR93 model in this paper). An
extension of the BR93 model was used to analyse a three-party server-based key
distribution (3PKD) protocol by Bellare & Rogaway [6], which we refer to as
the BR95 model. A more recent revision to the model was proposed in 2000
by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [4], hereafter referred to as the BPR2000
model. In independent yet related work, Bellare, Canetti, & Krawczyk [3] build
on the BR93 model and introduce a modular proof model. However, some draw-
backs with this formulation were discovered and this modular proof model was
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subsequently modified by Canetti & Krawczyk [8], and will be referred to as the
CK2001 model in this paper.
We observe that the definitions of security in the BR93, BR95, BPR2000 and
CK2001 models have two basic requirements, namely: two parties who have com-
pleted matching sessions (i.e., partners) are required to accept the same session
key (which we term a key sharing requirement) and the key secrecy requirement
(also known as implicit key authentication [16, Definition 12.6]) whereby no ad-
versary or anyone other than the legitimate parties involved will learn about the
session key at the end of a protocol run. Although the key sharing requirement
seems straight-forward, there are actually a number of possible variants of this
requirement. We identify several variants of the key sharing requirement and
present a brief discussion.
In this work, we revisit the Bellare–Rogaway 3PKD protocol [6] and the
authenticated key exchange protocol T S2 due to Jeong, Katz, & Lee [14]. The
3PKD protocol was proven secure in the BR95 model and subsequently Tin,
Boyd, & Gonzalez-Nieto [20] provided a claimed proof of security for the same
protocol in the CK2001 model. Protocol T S2 carries a claimed proof of security
in the BR93 model, but uses a different definition of partnership than that given
in the original model description.
We reveal previously unpublished flaws in these protocols, whereby we demon-
strate that both protocols violate the definition of security in the CK2001 and
BR93 models respectively. The attack we present on the 3PKD protocol is sim-
ilar to the attack on the Otway–Rees key establishment protocol [17] revealed
by Fabrega, Herzog, & Guttman [12], in which they showed that a malicious
adversary is able to make the initiator and the responder agree on a different
session key by asking a trusted third party (i.e., server) to create multiple session
keys in response to the same message.
This paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 provides an
informal overview of the proof models. Section 3 describes the 3PKD protocol,
describes an example execution of the protocol to demonstrate how the 3PKD
protocol is insecure in the CK2001 model, and presents a new provably-secure
3PKD protocol in the CK2001 model. Section 4 describes protocol T S2, de-
scribes an example execution of the protocol to demonstrate how protocol T S2
is insecure in the BR93 model, and provides a simple fix to the protocol speci-
fication. Section 5 presents a discussion on the four variants of the key sharing
requirement that we have identified. Section 6 presents the conclusions.
2 The Proof Models
In this section, an informal overview of the BR93, BR95, BPPR2000 models [4–6]
and the CK2001 model [3, 8] is presented.
2.1 Bellare-Rogaway Models
In the BR93, BR95, and BPR2000 models, the adversary A is defined to be a
probabilistic machine that is in control of all communications between parties
by interacting with a set of Π iU1,U2 oracles (i.e., Π
i
U1,U2
is defined to be the ith
instantiation of a principal U1 in a specific protocol run and U2 is the principal
with whom U1 wishes to establish a secret key). The oracle queries are shown in
Table 1.
Send(U1, U2, i,m)This query to oracle Π
i
U1,U2
computes a response according to the
protocol specification and decision on whether to accept or reject yet,
and returns them to the adversary A. If the client oracle, Π iU1,U2 ,
has either accepted with some session key or terminated, this will be
made known to A.
Reveal(U1, U2, i) The client oracle, Π
i
U1,U2
, upon receiving this query and if it has
accepted and holds some session key, will send this session key back
to A. This query is known as a Session-Key Reveal in the CK2001
model.
Corrupt(U1,KE) This query allows A to corrupt the principal U1 at will, and thereby
learn the complete internal state of the corrupted principal. The
corrupt query also gives A the ability to overwrite the long-lived
key of the corrupted principal with any value of her choice (i.e. KE).
Test(U1, U2, i) This query is the only oracle query that does not correspond to any
of A’s abilities. If ΠiU1,U2 has accepted with some session key and is
being asked a Test(U1, U2, i) query, then depending on a randomly
chosen bit b, A is given either the actual session key or a session key
drawn randomly from the session key distribution.
Table 1. Informal description of the oracle queries
Security depends on the notions of partnership of oracles and indistinguisha-
bility of session keys. The definition of partnership is used in the definition of
security to restrict the adversary’s Reveal and Corrupt queries to oracles that are
not partners of the oracle whose key the adversary is trying to guess.
BR93 partnership is defined using the notion of matching conversations,
where a conversation is defined to be the sequence of messages sent and re-
ceived by an oracle. The sequence of messages exchanged (i.e., only the Send
oracle queries) are recorded in the transcript, T . At the end of a protocol run,
T will contain the record of the Send queries and the responses as shown in
Figure 1. Definition 1 gives a simplified definition of matching conversations for
the case of the protocol shown in Figure 1.
Definition 1 (BR93 Definition of Matching Conversations [5]) Let n be
the maximum number of sessions between any two parties in the protocol run.
Run the protocol shown in Figure 1 in the presence of a malicious adversary A
and consider an initiator oracle Π iA,B and a responder oracle Π
j
B,A who engage
in conversations CA and CB respectively. Π
i
A,B and Π
j
B,A are said to be partners
if they both have matching conversations, where
CA = (τ0,
′ start′, α1), (τ2, β1, α2)
CB = (τ1, α1, β1), (τ3, α2, ∗), for τ0 < τ1 < . . .PSfrag replacements
ΠiA,B Π
j
B,A
‘start’
α1
α1
β1
β1
α2
α2
*
time τ0
time τ1
time τ2
time τ3
Note that the construction of conversa-
tion shown in Definition 1 depends on
the number of parties and the number of
message flows. Informally, both Π iA,B and
Π
j
B,A are said to be BR93 partners if each
one responded to a message that was sent
unchanged by its partner with the excep-
tion of perhaps the first and last message.
Fig. 1. Matching conversation [5]
BR95 partnership is defined using a partner function, which uses the tran-
script to determine the partner of an oracle. However, no explicit definition of
partnership was provided in the original paper since there is no single part-
ner function fixed for any protocol. Instead, security is defined predicated on
the existence of a suitable partner function. However, such a partner definition
can easily go wrong. One such example is the partner function described in the
original BR95 paper for the 3PKD protocol [6], which was later found to be
flawed [10].
BPR2000 partnership is defined using session identifiers (SIDs) where SIDs
are suggested to be the concatenation of messages exchanged during the protocol
run. In this model, an oracle who has accepted will hold the associated session
key, a SID and a partner identifier (PID). Definition 2 describes the definition
of partnership in the BPR2000 model. Note that any oracle that has accepted
will have at most one partner, if any at all.
Definition 2 (BPR2000 Definition of Partnership [4]) Two oracles, Π iA,B
and ΠjB,A, are partners if, and only if, both oracles have accepted the same ses-
sion key with the same SID, have agreed on the same set of principals (i.e. the
initiator and the responder of the protocol), and no other oracles besides Π iA,B
and ΠjB,A have accepted with the same SID.
2.2 Canetti-Krawczyk Model
In the CK2001 model, there are two adversarial models, namely the UM and the
AM. Let AUM denote the adversary in the UM, and AAM denote the adversary
in the AM . The difference between AAM and AUM lies in their powers. Table 2
provides an informal description of the oracle queries allowed for AAM and AUM.
Session-State Reveal An oracle, upon receiving this query and if it has neither ac-
cepted nor held some session key, will return all its internal
state (including any ephemeral parameters but not long-term
secret parameters) to the adversary.
Send Equivalent to the Send query in Table 1. However, AAM is
restricted to only delay, delete, and relay messages but not to
fabricate any messages or send a message more than once.
Session−Key Reveal, Corrupt, and Test queries are equivalent to those queries listed
in Table 1.
Table 2. Informal description of the oracle queries allowed for AAM and AUM
A protocol that is proven to be secure in the AM can be translated to a
provably secure protocol in the UM with the use of an authenticator. We require
the definitions of an emulator, and an authenticator as given in Definitions 3
and 4 respectively.
Definition 3 (Definition of an Emulator [3]) Let pi and pi′ be two n-party
protocols where pi and pi′ are protocols in the AM and the UM respectively. pi′ is
said to emulate pi if for any AUM , there exists an AAM , such that for all input
vectors
→
m, no polyomial time adversary can distinguish the cumulative outputs
of all parties and the adversary between the AM and the UM with more than
negligible probability.
Definition 4 (CK2001 Definition of an Authenticator [8]) An authenti-
cator is defined to be a mapping transforming a protocol piAM in the AM to a
protocol piUM in the UM such that piUM emulates piAM.
In other words, the security proof of a UM protocol depends on the security
proofs of the MT-authenticators used and that of the associated AM protocol.
If any of these proofs break down, then the proof of the UM protocol is invalid.
Partnership in the CK2001 model can be defined using the notion of matching
sessions, as desribed in Definition 5.
Definition 5 (Matching Sessions [8]) Two sessions are said to be matching
if they have the same session identifiers (SIDs) and corresponding partner iden-
tifiers (PIDs).
In the Bellare–Rogaway and the CK2001 models, SIDs are unique and known
to everyone (including A). Hence, session keys cannot be included as part of SIDs
in the protocols. In the CK2001 model, A chooses unique SIDs for each pair of
participants, although, in practice, SIDs are generally agreed using some unique
contributions from each participant.
2.3 Definition of Freshness
Freshness is used to identify the session keys about which A ought not to know
anything because A has not revealed any oracles that have accepted the key
and has not corrupted any principals knowing the key. Definition 6 describes
freshness, which depends on the notion of partnership. Note that we do not
consider the notion of forward secrecy in this paper, otherwise, the definition of
freshness would be slightly different.
Definition 6 (Definition of Freshness) Oracle Π iA,B is fresh (or holds a fresh
session key) at the end of execution, if, and only if, (1) Π iA,B has accepted with
or without a partner oracle ΠjB,A, (2) both Π
i
A,B and Π
j
B,A oracles have not been
sent a Reveal query (or Session-State Reveal in the CK2001 model), and (3) A
and B have not been sent a Corrupt query.
2.4 Definition of Security
Security in the four models is defined using the game G, played between A and
a collection of player oracles. A runs the game G, whose setting is explained in
Table 3.
Stage 1: A is able to send any oracle queries at will.
Stage 2: At some point during G, A will choose a fresh session on which to be tested
and send a Test query to the fresh oracle associated with the test session.
Depending on the randomly chosen bit b, A is given either the actual session
key or a session key drawn randomly from the session key distribution.
Stage 3: A continues making any oracle queries at will but cannot make Corrupt or
Reveal queries that trivially expose the test session key.
Stage 4: Eventually, A terminates the game simulation and outputs a bit b′, which is
its guess of the value of b.
Table 3. Setting of game G
Success of A in G is quantified in terms of A’s advantage in distinguishing
whether A receives the real key or a random value. A wins if, after asking a
Test(U1, U2, i) query, where Π
i
U1,U2
is fresh and has accepted with the same
session key, A’s guess bit b′ equals the bit b selected during the Test(U1, U2, i)
query. Let the advantage function of A be denoted by AdvA(k), where AdvA(k)
= 2× Pr[b = b′]− 1.
Definitions 7, 8, and 9 describe the definition of security for the BR95 model,
the BPR2000 model, and both the BR93 and CK2001 models respectively.
Definition 7 (BR95 Definition of Security [6]) A protocol is secure in the
BR95 model if both the following requirements are satisfied:
1. When the protocol is run between two oracles Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A in the absence
of a malicious adversary, both Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A accept and hold the same
session key.
2. For all probabilistic, polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries A, AdvA(k) is neg-
ligible.
Definition 8 (BPR2000 Definition of Security [4]) A protocol is secure in
the BPR2000 model if both the following requirements are satisfied:
1. When the protocol is run between two oracles Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A in the absence
of a malicious adversary, both Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A accept and hold the same
session key.
2. For all PPT adversaries A, (a) the advantage that A has in violating entity
authentication is negligible, and (b) AdvA(k) is negligible.
Definition 9 (BR93 and CK2001 Definitions of Security [5, 8]) A proto-
col is secure in the BR93 and CK2001 models if both the following requirements
are satisfied:
1. When the protocol is run between two oracles Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A in the absence
of a malicious adversary, both Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A accept and hold the same
session key.
2. For all PPT adversaries A, (a) If uncorrupted oracles Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A com-
plete matching sessions, then both Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A must hold the same ses-
sion key, and (b) AdvA(k) is negligible.
For the BR93 model, if both oracles Π iA,B and Π
j
B,A have accepted, then the
probability that oracle ΠjB,A does not engage in a matching conversation with
oracle Π iA,B is negligible.
3 Bellare–Rogaway 3PKD Protocol
In this section, we demonstrate that the 3PKD protocol is insecure in the CK2001
model, contradicting the claim by Tin et al. [20]. We point out that the existing
proof breaks down because the uniqueness of SIDs is not ensured. We then
describe the MAC-based MT-authenticator [8], and protocol AM-3PKD proven
secure in the AM [20]. By applying the MT-authenticator on protocol AM-3PKD,
we obtain a new provably-secure 3PKD protocol in the CK2001 model.
3.1 3PKD Protocol
The 3PKD protocol in Figure 2 involves three parties, a trusted server S and two
principals A and B. The notations {·}Kenc
AS
and [·]KMAC
AS
denote the encryption of
some message under KencAS and the computation of a MAC digest under K
MAC
AS
respectively. KencAS is the encryption key shared between A and S, K
MAC
AS is the
MAC key shared between A and S, and both keys are independent of each other.
The protocol begins by having A randomly select a k-bit challenge RA and
send it to the B with whom she desires to communicate. Upon receiving the
message RA from A, B also randomly selects a k-bit challenge RB and sends RB
together with RA as a message (RA, RB) to the server S. S, upon receiving the
message (RA, RB) from B, runs the session key generator to obtain a session key
A S B
RA ∈R {0, 1}
k A,RA
−−−−−−−→ Randomly generate SKAB
B,RB
←−−−−−−− RB ∈R {0, 1}
k
αa = {SKAB}Kenc
AS
βa = [A,B,RA, αa]KMAC
AS
αb = {SKAB}Kenc
BS
βb = [A,B,RB , αb]KMAC
BS
αa, βa
←−−−−−−−
αb, βb
−−−−−−−→
Decrypt αa Decrypt αb
If βa verifies true, then If βb verifies true, then
Accept SKAB Accept SKAB
Fig. 2. 3PKD protocol
SKAB , which has not been used before. S then encrypts SKAB with K
enc
AS and
KencBS to obtain ciphertexts αA and αB , and computes the MAC digests βA and
βB of the strings (A,B,RA, {SKAB}Kenc
AS
) and (A,B,RB , {SKAB}Kenc
BS
) under
the keys KMACAS and K
MAC
BS respectively. S then sends messages (αA,βA) and
(αB ,βB) to A and B respectively.
Tin et al. [20] suggest that SIDs can be constructed on the fly using unique
contributions from both the initiator and the responder (i.e., sidA = (RA, RB)
and sidB = (RA, RB) respectively).
3.2 New Attack on 3PKD Protocol
Figure 3 depicts an example execution of the 3PKD protocol in the presence of a
malicious adversary A. Let AU denote A impersonating some user U . At the end
of the protocol execution shown in Figure 3, both uncorrupted principals A and
B have matching sessions according to Definition 5. However, they have accepted
different session keys (i.e., A and B accept SKAB and SKAB,2 respectively). This
violates requirement 2a of Definition 9.
A S B
A,RA
−−−−−−−→
B,RB
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SKAB
αa, βa
←−−−−−−−
αb, βb
−−−−−−−→ A intercepts message
A,B,RA, RB
←−−−−−−− AB resends message
αb′ = {SKAB,2}Kenc
BS
βb′ = [A,B,RB , αb′ ]KMAC
BS
αb′ , βb′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ SKAB,2
Fig. 3. Execution of 3PKD protocol in the presence of a malicious adversary
We observe that the existing proof fails because the current construction of
SIDs does not guarantee uniqueness. Our observation supports the findings of
Choo et al. [10] that it does not seem possible to define a unique SID in the
existing 3PKD protocol.
3.3 A New Provably-Secure 3PKD Protocol in the CK2001 (UM)
A quick fix to the 3PKD protocol is to require the server to store every mes-
sage processed and not issue different session keys for the same input message
received, similar to the approach taken by Backes [1] in his proof of security
for the Otway–Rees protocol in the cryptographic library, which has a provably
secure cryptographic implementation. However, we argue that this assumption
only works well within a confined implementation and will not scale well to a
more realistic environment with a large number of participating parties and a
substantial level of traffic to any one server.
Another possible fix would be to introduce two extra messages for key confir-
mation, which would ensure that both parties have the assurance that the other
(partner) party is able to compute the (same) session key. However, this would
increase the computational load of both the initiator and the responder.
As an improvement, we present an improved provably-secure protocol in the
CK2001 model by applying the Canetti–Krawczyk MAC-based MT-authenticator
to the Tin–Boyd–Gonzalez-Nieto protocol AM-3PKD. Figures 4 and 5 describe
the MAC-based MT-authenticator [8] and the protocol AM-3PKD (which is
proven secure in the AM) [20] respectively.
A B
NB←−−−−−−− Choose nonce NB
Choose message m
m, [B,NB ,m]K
MAC
AB
−−−−−−−→
Fig. 4. Canetti–Krawczyk MAC-based MT-authenticator
A S B
Randomly generate SKAB
αa = {SKAB}Kenc
AS
Decrypt αa
sid, αa, B
←−−−−−−− αb = {SKAB}Kenc
BS
sid, αb, A
−−−−−−−→ Decrypt αb
Fig. 5. Tin–Boyd–Gonzalez-Nieto protocol AM-3PKD
A S B
RA ∈R {0, 1}
k A,RA
−−−−−−−→
B,RB
←−−−−−−− RB ∈R {0, 1}
k
Randomly generate SKAB
RS ∈R {0, 1}
k
αA = {SKAB}Kenc
AS
βA = [A,B,RA, RB , RS , αA]KMAC
AS
αB = {SKAB}Kenc
BS
βB = [A,B,RA, RB , RS , αB ]KMAC
BS
Decrypt αa
A,αA, βA, RB , RS
←−−−−−−−
B,αB , βB , RA, RS
−−−−−−−→ Decrypt αb
If βa verifies true, then If βb verifies true, then
SKAB sidA = (RA, RB , RS) = sidB SKAB
Fig. 6. A new provably-secure 3PKD protocol in the CK2001 (UM)
Figure 6 describes the resultant UM protocol. In this protocol, S will generate
a random nonce RS each time a session key is generated. RS will be sent together
with the associated session key to both A and B together with the contributions
by both A and B (i.e., RA and RB). Within the new protocol, the only values
that A and B can be sure are unique are RA, RB , and RS , and hence SIDs are
constructed using these values (i.e., uniqueness of SIDs is ensured).
Intuitively, the attack outlined in Figure 3 will no longer be valid, since a new
nonce is generated each time a new session key is generated. Note that there is a
subtle difference between our new 3PKD protocol (as shown in Figure 6) and the
fix proposed by Choo et al. [10]. In their fix, S does not generate a random nonce
RS each time a session key is generated. Hence, the attack outlined in Figure 3
is still valid against their fix. However, their protocol is secure in the BPR2000
model (in which their protocol is proven secure), since the BPR2000 partnership
(i.e., Definition 8) requires two parties to have matching SIDs, agreeing PIDs,
and the same session key in order to be partners. Clearly, in the context of our
attack, the two oracles are not BPR2000 partners. Hence, the BPR2000 security
is not violated.
Table 4 presents a comparison of the computational loads between our new
3PKD protocol and three other similar server-based three-party key establish-
ment protocols, namely the Yahalom protocol [7], the Bauer–Berson–Feiertag
protocol [2] and the Otway-Rees protocol [17]. We observe that the three other
protocols are unable to satisfy the key share requirement in the presence of a
malicious adversary (without making some “impractical” assumption – requiring
the server to store every message processed and not issuing different session keys
for the same message). From Table 4, we also observe that the computational
load of our new 3PKD protocol is comparable to those of the other protocols, yet
provides a tighter definition of security (i.e., secure in the sense of Definition 9).
Computational Op-
eration
New 3PKD protocol Yahalom protocol [7] / Otway-Rees
protocol [17] / Bauer–Berson–
Feiertag protocol [2]
A B S A B S
Encryption and De-
cryption
1 1 2 2/2/1 3/2/1 3/4/2
MAC generation 0 0 2 0 0 0
Messages 4
Proof of Security Yes No, except for the Otway-Rees protocol.
Security Goal Key establishment Key establishment (however, parties who
complete matching sessions (partners),
are not guaranteed to share the same ses-
sion key.)
Table 4. Comparison of the computational loads
4 Jeong–Katz–Lee Protocol T S2
Figure 7 describes protocol T S2 [14]. All arithmetic is performed modulo a
large prime p with q being the prime order of g. The protocol uses a different
partnering function, as described in Definition 10.
Definition 10 (Modified Definition of Partnership) Two oracles, Π iA,B and
Π
j
B,A, are partners if, and only if, they have agreed on the same set of principals
(i.e. the initiator and the responder of the protocol), and no other oracles besides
ΠiA,B and Π
j
B,A have accepted with the same SID.
Both the initiator and responder principals, A and B, are assumed to have
a public/private key pair (PA, SA) and (PB , SB) respectively. At the end of
the protocol execution, both A and B accept with the session key SKAB =
H0(A||B||sid||g
RARB ||gSASB ) = SKBA.
A (PA, SA) B (PB , SB)
RA ∈R Zq
gRA
−−−−−−−→ RB ∈R Zq
sidA = g
RA ||gRB
gRB
←−−−−−−− sidB = g
RA ||gRB
Fig. 7. Jeong–Katz–Lee protocol T S2
4.1 New Attack on Protocol T S2
Figure 8 desribes the execution of protocol T S2 in the presence of a malicious
adversary A, where A intercepts both messages and sends fabricated messages
gRA ||1 and 1||gRB to both B and A respectively.
A (PA, SA) A B (PB , SB)
RA ∈R Zq
gRA
−−−−−−−→
gRB
←−−−−−−− RB ∈R Zq
sidA = g
RA ||1||gRB
1||gRB
←−−−−−−−
gRA ||1
−−−−−−−→ sidB = g
RA ||1||gRB
Fig. 8. Execution of protocol T S2 in the presence of a malicious adversary
At the end of the protocol execution shown in Figure 8, both A and B have
accepted with sidA = g
RA ||1||gRB = sidB . Hence, according to Definition 10,
both ΠsidAA,B and Π
sidB
B,A are partners since they have accepted with the same SID
and PID(A) = B and PID(B) = A. However, both ΠsidAA,B and Π
sidB
B,A have
accepted with different session keys
SKAB = H0(A||B||sidA||(1||g
RB )RA ||gSASB )
SKBA = H0(A||B||sidB ||(g
RA ||1)RB ||gSASB ) 6= SKBA,
in violation of requirement 2a in Definition 9.
A simple fix to protocol T S2 is to include validity checking of the received
messages by the recipient, as shown in Figure 9. The validity checking ensures
that the messages received by each party are in the group and that the bit
lengths of the messages received by each party are correct. Intuitively, the attack
outlined in Figure 8 will no longer be valid since the fabricated messages sent
by the adversary will fail the validity check. Let BL(·) denote the bit length of
some message.
A (PA, SA) B (PB , SB)
RA ∈R Zq RB ∈R Zq
Zero pad gRA to dlog2(p− 1)e bits
gRA
−−−−−−−→ Check whether
2 ≤ gRA ≤ p− 1, (gRA)q 6= 1, BL(gRA)
?
= dlog2(p− 1)e
Check whether
gRB
←−−−−−−− Zero pad g
RB to dlog2(p− 1)e bits
2 ≤ gRB ≤ p− 1, (gRB )q 6= 1, BL(gRB )
?
= dlog2(p− 1)e
sidA = g
RA ||gRB sidB = g
RA ||gRB
SKAB = H0(A||B||sidA||g
RARB ||gSASB ) = SKBA
Fig. 9. A possible fix to Jeong–Katz–Lee protocol T S2
We may speculate that if the protocol designers fail to spot this inadequancy
in the specification of their protocols, the protocol implementers are also highly
unlikely to spot this inadequancy. Flaws in security protocol proofs or protocol
specifications themselves certainly will have a damaging effect on the credibility
of provably-secure protocols in the real world [19].
5 The Key Sharing Requirement
The key sharing requirement varies between the BR93, BR95, BPR2000, and
CK2001 models. In this section, we identify four possible variants of the key
sharing requirement, as shown in Table 5. Fabrega et al. [12] have also observed
the ambiguity surrounding key sharing requirements (which they term key au-
thentication) in the context of the Otway–Rees protocol. Although they did not
see this as a serious flaw, they did highlight the lack of understanding of the
protocol and the need to identify exactly what goals a protocol achieves.
Variant Required in
KSR1 Two communicating parties completing matching ses-
sions in the absence of a malicious adversary accept
the same session key.
BR95 model.
KSR2 Two communicating parties completing matching ses-
sions in the presence of a malicious adversary accept
the same session key.
BR93, BPR2000,
CK2001 models.
KSR3 One party is assured that a second (possibly unidenti-
fied) party is able to compute a particular secret ses-
sion key.
Optional in any of the
BR93, BR95, BPR2000,
or CK2001 models.
KSR4 One party is assured that a second (possibly unidenti-
fied) party actually has possession of a particular se-
cret session key.
Not achievable in reduc-
tionist proof approach
for protocols, as shown
below.
Table 5. Variants of key sharing requirement
KSR1 is a completeness requirement, which ensures that a key establishment
protocol is behaving correctly. We advocate that KSR2 is a practical functional
requirement and depending on the individual implementation, KSR2 require-
ment can be as important as the key secrecy requirement. Consider the scenario
of a real world implementation of one key establishment protocol that does not
provide the KSR2 requirement: two partners after completing matching sessions,
are unable to share the same session key. From the protocol implementers’ per-
spective, the usefulness (or practicality) of such a key establishment protocol
will be questionable.
KSR3 is a weaker version of KSR4, where KSR4 is the key confirmation goal
given in [16, Definition 12.7]. KSR4 is generally not achievable in the setting of
the reductionist proof approach for protocols for the following reason. In order
for one party, A to be assured that a second (possibly unidentified) party, B,
actually has possession of the secret session key, A would need to send to B
some information derived from the key, such as the encryption of some message
with the secret session key. However, in the context of the proof simulation, A
can ask a Send query using the test session key obtained from a Test query,
and determine whether the test session key it was given (by the simulator) was
real or random. Consequently, such information renders the protocol insecure
as AdvA(k) will be non-negligible. KSR3 is a weaker version of KSR4, where
the latter variant is the key confirmation goal given by Menezes, Oorschot, &
Vanstone [16, Definition 12.7]. Note that KSR4 is not achievable in the setting of
the reductionist proof approach for protocols for the following reason. Recall that
security in the BR93, BR95, BPR2000, and CK2001 models is defined using a
game simulation, G, played between A and a collection of player oracles. Success
of A in G is quantified in terms of A’s advantage in distinguishing whether A
receives a real key or a random value from the game simulator. In order for one
party, A to be assured that a second (possibly unidentified) party, B, actually
has possession of a particular secret session key, A would need to send to B
some information derived from the key, such as the encryption of some message
with the secret session key, as shown in Figure 10, which describes the Yahalom
protocol [7]
1. A→ B : NA
2. B → S : B, {A,NA, NB}Kenc
BS
3. S → A : {B,SKAB , NA, NB}Kenc
AS
, {A,SKAB}Kenc
BS
4. A→ B : {A,SKAB}Kenc
BS
, {NB}SKAB
The session key is SKUi = H(N1||N2|| . . . ||Nn).
Fig. 10. Yahalom protocol
In the protocol, we observe that B is assured that A actually has possession
of the same secret session key, SKAB
1. However, in the context of the proof sim-
ulation, the adversary A can ask a Send query using the test session key obtained
from a Test query, and determine whether the test session key it was given (by
the simulator) was real or random. Consequently, such information renders the
protocol insecure as A will have a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the
Test key received from the game simulator.
Recommendations We would recommend that the proof models allow different
options for the key sharing requirement in their formulation. KSR1 is a minimum
requirement as it ensures the (basic) correctness of a protocol, KSR3 implies
KSR2, and KSR2 implies KSR1. Protocols proven secure in such a model must
indicate which variant of the key sharing requirement is satisfied.
6 Conclusion
A detailed study of the Bellare–Rogaway 3PKD protocol and the Jeong–Katz–
Lee protocol T S2 was made. We demonstrated that both protocols fail to achieve
1 We observe that protocols proposed using an automated tool search in the computer
security approach [9,11,13,15,18] usually provide key confirmation in this fashion –
KSR4 shown in Table 5.
the key sharing requirement in the presence of a malicious adversary, in violation
of the definition of security in their respective models. Despite the importance of
proofs in assuring protocol implementers of the security properties of protocols,
we conclude that specifying correct proofs remains a difficult problem.
As an improvement, we presented a new 3PKD protocol with a proof of
security in the CK2001 model. A comparison with three existing three-party
server-based protocols reveals that the computational load of our new 3PKD
protocol is no more than that of the three other protocols, yet ensures that a
stronger version of the key sharing requirement is satisfied. We also proposed
a simple fix to the specification of protocol T S2 and identified four possible
variants of the key sharing requirement. As a result of this work, we would
recommend that the proof models for key establishment protocols allow the
various options of the key sharing requirement, depending on the individual
needs of the protocol implementations and applications.
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